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Abstract
Purpose
This paper uses Stones’ Strong Structuration Theory (SST) that combines Giddens’ duality and Archer’s 
analytical dualism to deal with the paradox of embedded agency, focussing on resistance, in the 
budgeting literature. It also applies this framework to an illustrative case study that examines a failed 
attempt to implement performance based budgeting (PBB) in the Egyptian Sales Tax Department (ESTD).
Design/methodology/approach
We have used SST as an analytical framework. Longitudinal case study data were collected from 
interviews, observations, discussions and documentary analysis, and from publicly available reports and 
other media issued by the World Bank.
Findings
The SST framework identifies the circumstances in which middle managers as embedded agency have 
limited possibilities to change their dispositions to act and identify opportunities for emancipation in the 
wider social context in which they are embedded. The official explanation for the failure to implement 
PBB in Egypt was obstruction by middle managers. The findings of this study provide an alternative 
explanation to that published by the World Bank for the failure to institutionalise PBB in Egypt. It was 
found that the middle managers were the real supporters of PBB. Other parties and existing laws and 
regulations contributed to the failure of PBB.
Research limitations/implications
As a practical implication of the study, the analysis presented here offers an alternative interpretation of 
the failure of the Egyptian project for monitoring and evaluation to that published by the World Bank. 
This case and similar cases may enhance our understanding of how and when monitoring and evaluation 
technologies should be introduced at the global level, in order to manage conflicts of interest between 
agencies and beneficiaries.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the extant management accounting literature on the use of structuration 
theory in addressing the paradox of embedded agency in making or resisting structural change. It uses 
SST to integrate Giddens’ structuration theory (ST) with critical realist theory, incorporating duality and 
dualism in a stronger model of structuration. The SST framework offers a means of analysing case 
studies that result from interactions and conjunctures between different groups of actors, at different 
ontological levels. The paper also examines the issue of embedded agency in budgeting research using 
an illustrative case study from a developing country, Egypt. 
Keywords – Embedded agency, strong structuration theory, performance-based budgeting, resistance, 
Egypt. 
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1. Introduction
In their recent review of agency and structure in budgeting research, Kilfoyle and Richardson (2011) 
argue that agent-centered and structure-centered perspectives has been used as mutually exclusive 
alternatives. However, the agency or institutional approaches alone are not able to explain budgeting 
phenomena, especially the paradox of embedded agency in which structurally embedded agents are 
able to introduce structural change. To escape the dichotomy between agency/structure perspectives, 
Giddens’ ST has been introduced into the management accounting research by Macintosh and Scapens 
(1990) to understand change in budgeting processes (e.g. Conrad, 2005; Edwards et al., 2005; Ezzamel et 
al., 2007; Gurd, 2008; Kilfoyle and Richardson, 2011). By treating structure and agency as being mutually 
constitutive, it captures the dynamic reality of budgeting processes. Based on Giddens’ flat and local 
duality perspective, Englund and Gerdin (2011; 2018) suggest a framework for analysing and unpacking 
the paradox of embedded agency in budgeting research.  
Archer (1982; 1995) has criticised Giddens’ ST for what she has dubbed ‘central conflation’ of structure 
and agent. Giddens’ emphasis on duality, whereby structures exist as memory traces and in the 
instantiation of practices, means that it is impossible to separate agency from structure and equally 
impossible to speak of the effect of one on the other (Stones, 2005). Ashraf and Uddin (2015) argue that 
Giddens does not acknowledge a temporal dimension in the relationship between social structure and 
agency. Archer’s solution to combining structure and agency is to apply ‘analytical dualism’ that allows 
one to investigate the interplay between structural conditioning, social interaction and its immediate 
outcome, and structural elaboration (Archer, 1995). The concept of analytical dualism, in which 
structure and action work on different time intervals, has been employed by Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
and later by Burns and Scapens (2000).  
Building on the above critics as well as other social theorists’ critics, Stones (2005) introduced a 
reinforced version of structuration theory that combines Giddens’ duality and Archer’s analytical 
dualism in one theoretical framework, SST.  Ashraf and Uddin (2015: 492) argue that ‘Stones 
incorporates both duality and dualism in his “stronger” model of structuration’. SST is seen by 
commentators on Giddens as a very significant development in the theory (Bryant and Jary, 2011). 
Critics of Giddens’ ST have argued that his flat approach to ontology is flawed: Mouzelis (1995), in 
particular, makes a strong case that society is made up of hierarchies and that any analysis must account 
for these different ontological levels. Kilfoyle and Richardson (2011) argue that the existence of multiple 
sets of structures opens the opportunity to understand processes of resistance and provides a more 
nuanced way of understanding the dialectic of control embedded in Giddens (1984; 1979). SST has been 
proposed as a basis for studies in accounting and management case study research by Jack and Kholeif 
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empirical research (Bryant and Jary, 2011). Papers using strong structuration theory (Jack and Kholeif, 
2008; Coad and Herbert, 2009; Feeney and Pierce, 2016; Harris et al., 2016; Makrygiannakis and Jack, 
2016; Adhikari and Jayasinghe, 2017; Daff and Jack, 2018) have been recognised as the few studies in 
the accounting discipline that engage critically with Giddens’ work (Englund et al., 2011; Englund and 
Gerdin, 2014).  
Englund and Gerdin (2016) see duality and dualism as mutually exclusive ontologies. They argue that 
‘either you adopt an essentialist approach implying that some social structures have particular meanings 
and causal influences which are independent of human actors (advocated by Coad et al. 2015), or a non-
essentialist approach (as in a flat and local ontology) implying that social structures have no existence in 
and of themselves’ (p. 261). Instead Stones (2005) argue that duality and dualism should be used as 
complementary tools for concrete social analysis (see also Ashraf and Uddin, 2015, p. 492; Modell, 2017, 
p. 23). The main purpose of this paper is to use Stones’ SST to complement Englund and Gerdin’s (2011;
2018) flat and local ontology by incorporating external structures and dualism to deal with the paradox
of embedded agency, focussing on resistance, in the budgeting literature. The paper also aims to apply
the SST framework to an illustrative case study of the failure to implement PBB in the ESTD. As a case
study of custom developed accounting software implementation, this is a success story with substantial
increases in taxation collected being shown, but although some elements of monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) were established, PBB was not implemented. Later World Bank documents blame difficulties and
obstacles raised by middle managers for the failure of the PBB project (Mackay, 2007; Schiavo-Campo,
2005; Hassanein, 2005). For example, Mackay (2007: 61) observes that ‘Yet efforts to institutionalize
M&E in Egypt have been substantially frustrated by mid-level officials who did not buy into this vision of
an M&E system’. WBOED (2004: 59) concludes that ‘the process has been entirely top-driven. There is
no evidence of meaningful participation by staff…the staff reaction has varied from inattention to
resistance’. In this case, middle managers are considered embedded agents and Stones’ framework is
used to analyse when, how and why embedded agents may choose to resist, and/or not resist in certain
conjunctures (meaning combinations of circumstances or events).
The reminder of this paper is organised into five sections. The next section introduces Stones’ SST as a 
theoretical framework for analysing the puzzle of embedded agency, focussing on resistance to change 
in budgeting processes. An outline of research methods is followed by the analysis of the failed attempt 
to introduce PBB into the ESTD as an illustrative case study and the discussion section. The final section 
concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Framework: SST and the paradox of embedded agency and resistance in budgeting
research
2.1 Giddens’ ST versus SST and the paradox of embedded agency
The paradox of embedded agency refers to the problem of accounting for structural change when the 
actions of agents are themselves conditioned by social structures that they wish to change (Kilfoyle and 
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This framework is based on Giddens’ flat and local duality perspective. Englund and Gerdin (2011, p. 
584; 2018, p. 2) encourage accounting researchers to use this ‘flat and local’ ontology. In this sense, a 
local ontology means there is no such thing as ‘external’ social structures that exist beyond the human 
mind; whereas a flat ontology suggests that there are no levels of social structures (e.g. micro/macro 
structures). However, this ontology suffers from several theoretical shortcomings (see for more details 
Stones, 2005; Jack and Kholeif, 2008; Coad et al., 2015). In this section, we use concepts of Stones’ SST 
to complement Englund and Gerdin’s (2011; 2018) flat and local ontology by incorporating external 
structures and dualism to study embedded agency in budgeting research. 
2.1.1 Giddens’ ST
In respond to Kilfoyle and Richardson’s (2011) call for the need to understand the paradox of embedded 
agency in the context of budgeting research, Englund and Gerdin (2011) propose a framework for 
analysing the role of embedded agents in making structural change. They identify four origins of 
structural changes as follows: (1) structural change driven by intentional agency (or knowledgeable and 
reflexive agents) and caused by endogenous influences; (2) structural change driven by intentional 
agency and caused by exogenous influences; (3) structural change driven by unintentional agency (or 
actors who do not actively seek change) and caused by endogenous influences; and finally (4) structural 
change driven by unintentional agency and caused by exogenous influences. 
Englund and Gerdin (2018) further develop their framework for analysing the paradox of embedded 
agency by identifying six qualities of social structures as sources of embedded agency, namely 
Generality, Inadequacy, Ambiguity, Multiplicity, Embeddedness and Reflexivity. They refer to this as the 
GIAMER framework.  Structural generality means that social structure is general and may be applied in a 
range of social situations. Structural inadequacy is a quality of social structures in which they may be 
perceived as inadequate as a guide for action. Structural ambiguity exists when social structures invite 
different interpretations. Structural multiplicity refers to the existence of multiple social structures. 
Structural embeddedness is the degree of embeddedness or the extent to which agents are embedded. 
Finally, structural reflexivity refers to various forms of reflexivity that are built into social structures. 
Recently, Englund and Gerdin (2018) has edited a special issue of Management Accounting Research 
that has been dedicated to study this paradox (Ahrens and Ferry, 2018; Hiebl, 2018; Horton and 
Wanderley, 2018).  The first paper explores how a UK public sector organisation can act as an 
institutional entrepreneur. It is based on a field study of budgeting practices in this organisation. 
Following the radical cuts in local government funding by the central government, Ahrens and Ferry 
(2018) show how Newcastle City Council not only resisted the cuts, but also used budgeting as an 
important resource in their attempts to pursue change in the form of increased local authority 
autonomy. They provide important insights into the paradox of embedded agency by showing how the 
budget cuts resulted in structural inadequacy as they drastically changed the conditions for reproducing 
Newcastle City Council’s existing operations. This structural inadequacy, in turn, triggered a form of 
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back to transform the power relations that made the imposed change possible in the first place. 
The second paper by Hiebl (2018) complements the work of Ahrens and Ferry (2018) by further 
elaborating on the role of management accounting as a political resource that may assists agents in 
realising embedded agency and overcoming political resistance by opponents to change. Based on a 
review of 64 articles covering more than two decades, he identifies, systemizes and discusses six ways in 
which management accounting can be mobilized so as to initiate and accomplish structural change. 
Three of these ways relate to how proactive agents can mobilize management accounting as a means of 
creating structural reflexivity by identifying the need, and gaining others’ support, for structural change, 
while the other three relate to how management accounting can contribute to actually implementing 
the change. The review shows that the mobilization of management accounting is rarely enough to 
accomplish structural change. Rather, management accounting typically interacts with a large array of 
other political resources, such as hierarchical power, discourse and anxiety. 
Finally, the third paper by Horton and Wanderley (2018) complements the other two by theorizing the 
change potential inherent in structural multiplicity. Drawing on social identity theory to develop a 
conceptual framework that links identity and identity conflict to change related behaviour, they focus on 
the role of multiple identities and identity conflicts among management accountants as a source of 
embedded agency. They argue that coexisting, multilevel and nested identities in terms of personal, 
professional and organizational identities are likely to spark processes of job crafting and identity work 
through creating commitments to multiple and potentially conflicting interests and values. They also 
highlight the role of management accountants’ job discretion and business involvement in shaping their 
responses to perceived identity conflicts.   
2.1.2 Stones’ SST
In recent reviews of 25 years of management accounting research using Giddens’ work, Englund et al. 
(2011) and Englund and Gerdin (2014) provide an insightful analysis of the use of structuration theory in 
accounting research and directions for future research. They also observe that community of accounting 
scholars has scarcely begun to exploit the theory’s full potential. One of the threads to emerge from 
their work concerns the paucity of accounting researchers who engage critically with structuration 
theory. By this they mean that researchers are insufficiently reflexive in their treatment of the theory 
and do not explore or challenge its assumptions. They find exceptions in the work of Jack and Kholeif 
(2008) and Coad and Herbert (2009), which employ a recent development, termed SST, introduced by 
the sociologist Rob Stones (2005). Stones (2005) addresses and synthesises the critiques by Archer, 
Mouzelis, Cohen and others to amend recognised deficiencies in Giddens’ ST. In developing his SST, 
Stones (2005) follows Mouzelis and other critics of Giddens in trying to distinguish between two types of 
duality (consistent with Giddens’ position) and two types of dualism (consistent with critical realists’ 
position). 
62.1.2.1 Duality in SST 
Focussing on the possible relations between two parts of the structuration process: the internal 
structures and the agent’s conduct in drawing upon them, Stones (2005) distinguishes between two 
types of duality within structuration theory as two ends of a continuum, drawing on Mouzelis (1991; 
2000), namely: (1) taken-for-granted duality, and (2) critical duality. At one end of the continuum, the 
taken-for-granted duality, is the relation between internal structures and agency that is ‘habitual, 
relatively unreflective, symbiosis in which the two merge into one another in the unfolding process of 
routinely getting on with life’ (Stones, 2005, p. 56). Agents in this category are potentially resistant to 
structural change as they do not actively seek change and they tend to reproduce the prevailing social 
orders. Resistance to change as adherence to earlier procedures or routines is observed in previous 
studies (e.g. Burns and Scapens, 2000; Granlund, 2001; Burns et al., 2003).  
The other end of the continuum, the critical duality, refers to ‘instances in which the agent has a degree 
of critical distance from the internal structures, such that she is able to take up a strategic-monitoring 
relationship to them, or to reflect upon them theoretically’ (Stones, 2005, p. 57). Agents in this category 
potentially initiate or support structural change. They may be institutional entrepreneurs who are 
knowledgeable and reflexive actively seek change. This is observed in previous studies such as 
Gooneratne and Hoque (2016), Micelotta et al. (2017) and Ahrens and Ferry (2018). Mouzelis (1991, p. 
30) claims that the further the ‘analysis shifts from individual to collective action, from micro to macro
actions’ then there will be a tendency for more critically reflective attitudes towards internal structures
to come to the fore. Despite that Mouzelis (1991) presents Giddens’ notion of duality as equivalent to
taken-for-granted duality, Stones (2005) argues that Giddens accepts the sort of distancing Mouzelis has
in mind as he puts much emphasis on agents as skilled, knowledgeable, interpretative, reflexive, and
able to do otherwise. Mouzelis (1991) argues that the overall structuration process will be the result of a
mixture of types of taken-for-granted duality and critical duality and Giddens (1976) agrees with
Mouzelis (1991) that the degree of distancing is variable.
2.1.2.2 Dualism in SST
Stones (2005) argues that the work of Mouzelis (1991) can be seen as complementary to the work of 
Archer (1982; 1995) in that it provides further refinements to the conceptualisation of dualism, of the 
relation between external structures and agents. Based on Mouzelis (1991), Stones (2005) identifies two 
types of dualism within structuration theory as two ends of another continuum: (1) intractable dualism, 
and (2) modifiable dualism or malleable dualism.  At one end of this continuum, intractable dualism 
represents those external structures that are relatively intractable to the agent-in-focus’s actions, that 
act as constraints and that place limits upon the options open to him (Stones, 2005, p. 66). The 
individual agent is unable to affect or change those external structures or they are pushed by external 
influences towards structural change. Under intractable dualism, Stones (2005, p. 111) distinguishes 
between two types of external causal influences on agents. The first type of influences is independent 
causal influences, when external structures have complete autonomy from the agents whom they affect 
and those agents do not have the physical capacity to control or resist. The second type of influences is 
irresistible causal forces, when agents do have the physical capacity to resist an external influence but 
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straightforward in their prescriptions (e.g. must-do type of structures), they have particular
feel that they do not have the ability to resist. Jack and Kholeif’s (2008) study provides an example of 
these types of influences in the context of budgeting implementation.  
At the other end of this continuum, modifiable dualism refers to those external structures that the 
agent-in-focus can significantly affect, structures that the individual agent is able to change (Stones, 
2005, p. 66). Agents in this category actively ‘absorb’ (pull) structural solutions from one social system to 
another. Linking the types of dualism in SST to the notion of social hierarchies, Mouzelis (1991) argues 
that there is an unequal contribution of actors to the creation and recreation of social orders. Therefore, 
intractable external structures to one agent wouldn’t be so to another agent differentially situated in 
terms of positions higher up the scale of a social hierarchy of one kind or another. The latter are known 
as macro-actors such as directors, vice-chancellors and ministers, whose location enables them to take 
decisions which extend more widely in time and space, whose power base gives them a capability such 
that the consequences of their decisions and actions affect the situations of many people (Mouzelis, 
1991). 
2.2 A systematic comparative analysis of the two structuration approaches
Coad et al. (2015) argue against the flat and local ontology advocated by Englund and Gerdin (2014) and 
Englund et al. (2011) in extant management accounting research. They discuss how SST may be used to 
further develop Giddens’ ST to better understand management accounting practices. In their comment 
on Coad et al. (2015), Englund and Gerdin (2016) challenge this critique. In this section, we highlight the 
similarities and differences between the two structuration approaches. 
2.2.1 The existence of internal social structures 
Both SST and Giddens’ ST acknowledge that virtual social structures exist as memory traces within the 
agent, i.e. internal social structures. In their GIAMER framework, Englund and Gerdin (2018) identify 
generality, inadequacy, ambiguity, multiplicity, embeddedness and reflexivity as qualities of internal 
social structures that constitute the sources of embedded agency. These qualities can be linked to the 
two types of duality in SST (see Table 1). 
Insert Table 1 here
From the above table, embeddedness and reflexivity in Englund and Gerdin’s (2018) framework are 
closely related to taken-for-grantedness and criticalness in SST respectively. They are presented as the 
two main qualities of internal social structures. The other four qualities in the GIAMER framework are 
sub-qualities under these two ends of a continuum as follows. 
8meanings that promote homogeneity of action and social structures are routinely reproduced. 
However, implicit and open-ended social structures allow for different interpretations that promote 
heterogeneity of action and may lead to more reflexive change of social structures.  
- Structural inadequacy (adequate/ inadequate): Social structures may be considered adequate as a
guide for action when the conditions for reproduction of social structures are met. In abnormal
situations such as intensified competition among organizations or reduced governmental funding,
social structures become inadequate and agents distance themselves from, and critically reflect on,
the (in)capability of extant structures.
- Structural generality (general/ specific): Some social structures are general dispositions that may
have a great time/space extension and are therefore more persistent over time and space, while
others are conjuncturally-specific structures that have a more narrow scope and may be relatively
flexible and prone to change.
- Structural multiplicity (homogeneous/ heterogeneous): Homogeneous social structures enable
agents to routinely reproduce them, while heterogeneous social structures that consist of various
elements such as symbolic, normative and cultural-cognitive is likely to spark reflexivity and may
lead to structural change.
2.2.2 The existence of external social structures 
A main difference between SST and Giddens’ ST is that SST recognizes the existence of external social 
structures that is completely rejected by Englund and Gerdin (2014) and Englund et al. (2011). Englund 
and Gerdin (2016) argue that ‘…the strong structuration theory assumes that external structures are 
autonomous from and independent of the agents who produce them…structures can never be 
autonomous from and independent of those who produce them’ (p. 259; original italics). They 
emphasize that ‘…researchers applying a flat and local ontology may … find that some structural 
elements are perceived by actors as objective, taken-for-granted, non-controllable and even “external” 
to the actors in question’ (p. 260, original italics). From a SST perspective, Stones (2005) differentiates 
between intractable external structures and modifiable external structures. Englund and Gerdin (2016) 
focus only on the first type in which external causal influences are independent and/ or irresistible and 
do not take into account the other type in which agents can largely influence external social structures. 
In his attempt to clarify aspects of Giddens’ ST, Stones (2005) has extended ST, drawing on Giddens’ 
notion of position-practice relations that contains many of the real attributes of structures recognized 
by critical realism (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). Using this notion, Coad et al. (2015) reconcile the work of 
Stones and Giddens, arguing that individual social positions and collective social systems are empirically 
observable and are sustained by institutionalized practices that link agents across time and space in 
position-practice relations, i.e. external social structures. During moments of structuration, agents draw 
upon their (virtual) internal structures, which represent their understanding of (concrete) external 
structures, as a basis for active agency. In this regard, Stones (2005) argues that the differential ability of 
agents to resist the independent influence of external structures depends on positions within 
organisational hierarchies and horizontal position-practice relations and also according to other 
positional social categories such as class, age, cultural capital, sexuality, gender, race, ethnicity, and so 
on.    
92.2.3 The levels of social structures 
From a flat and local perspective, Englund and Gerdin (2016: 254) say that it is ‘difficult to imagine the 
social world as comprised by different levels in terms of micro-structures and macro-structures’. For 
Mouzelis (1995), attempts to eliminate the concept of micro and macro are simply absurd; society does 
consist of hierarchical arrangements and any attempt to integrate social theory and empirical study 
need to acknowledge this. One of Stones’ (2005) main concerns is the question of the role of ontology in 
empirical research.  Giddens’ analysis is largely aimed at an abstract ontology-in-general and lacks 
guidance on how to apply structuration theory in empirical research, where we need to consider 
ontology-in–situ. What he attempts to do entails taking ontology-in-general and pointing it towards the 
ontic, towards the realm of particular concrete and/or situated entities in the world with their particular 
qualities, relations, shapes, tone, texture, colour and so on (Jack and Kholeif, 2007).  
One key element of SST that develops Giddens’ ST is the “meso-level” ontological concept. If ontology-
in-general operates at an abstract level, and the ontic at the level of concrete details and specificities 
(Stones, 2005, p. 77), then the value of the meso-level ontology-in-situ is that the researcher can then 
analyse structure and agency in relative terms: more or less knowledgeability, for example (Stones, 
2005, p. 78). This creates effectively a sliding ontological-ontic sliding scale in which to position the 
agents in focus at some point between macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. Stones builds on his 
ontology-in-situ to develop the concept of the quadripartite nature of structuration, which is explored in 
Jack and Kholeif (2007).  This extends Giddens’ concepts of signification, legitimation and dominance 
into a framework more conducive to empirical study. The four parts (hence ‘quadripartite’ rather than 
‘four-part’ or ‘four-fold’) are: external structures as conditions of action; internal structures; active 
agency or agent’s practices and outcomes.  External structures involve position-practices and their 
networked relations. Internal structures are analysed into the ‘conjuncturally-specific’ and ‘general-
dispositions’.
2.2.5 Analytical and ontological separability of structure and agency
The issue of the separability of structure and agency in Giddens’ ST is a topic of much debate. Giddens’ 
ST is premised upon an assumption that structure and agency comprise a duality and not a dualism, i.e. 
the mutual constitution of structure and agency. Giddens’ position is described by Archer (1995) as 
‘central conflation’: the tendency to see structure as so closely intertwined with every aspect of practice 
that ‘the constituent components cannot be examined separately…In the absence of any degree of 
autonomy it becomes impossible to examine their interplay’ (Archer, 1988, pp. 77, 80; original italics). 
Archer’s (1995) view is that structure and agency are both analytically separable and ontologically 
separate. 
Englund and Gerdin (2011; 2018) advocate Giddens’ ontological position in which structure and agency 
may be separable analytically but they are not separable ontologically. Englund and Gerdin (2008: 1123) 
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suggest that ‘Giddens tries to overcome the dualism between structure and action, whereby structures 
are conceptualized as detached from human beings, he nevertheless argues that structure and action 
have fundamentally different properties.’ Giddens clearly defines structure (as rules and resources) and 
agency (as the capability to act) such that they are inextricably interlinked. The very fact that they are 
defined differently would seem to indicate that structure and agency are seen as separable analytically. 
However, Englund and Gerdin (2016) reject the ontological independence in which structure and agency 
are capable of exercising autonomous influences. They argue that ‘a flat and local structuration ontology 
emphasizes that…the notions of social structure and human action…are not to be “viewed as two 
independently given sets of phenomena”’ (ibid., p. 256, emphasis in the original). 
2.2.6 Temporality and SST as a processual approach 
To address the ontological separation of structure and agency, Archer (1995: 65) insists that structure 
and action reside in different temporal domains and suggests that they ‘can only be linked by explaining 
the interplay between them over time…without the proper incorporation of time the problem of 
structure and agency can never be satisfactorily resolved’. However, Giddens does not acknowledge that 
structure and agency work on different time intervals (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). According to Bhaskar 
(1986), social structures are presupposed by social interactions; they are existentially independent but 
essentially distinct. Giddens’ failure to fully address this aspect of his structuration theory is seen as one 
of its deficiencies by Bryant and Jary (2001, pp. 17-18), as the theory ‘has relatively little to say about the 
formation and distribution of the unacknowledged and acknowledged conditions of action or about the 
differential knowledgeability of actors’. Archer (1995) argues that Giddens fails to recognise the need to 
examine the interrelationships between structural conditioning and social interaction on the one hand, 
and the patterns of structural elaboration that emerge on the other, it is vital that we hold the 
categories of agency and structure apart for the purpose of analysis, i.e. to accept analytical dualism. 
Consistent with critical realism’s analytical dualism, Barley and Tolbert (1997) introduce a temporal 
dimension in the relationship between social structure and agency in order to develop a model of 
institutionalization as a structuration process in organization studies. They substitute the notion of 
scripts for Giddens’ notion of modalities. Based on Barley and Tolbert’s model, Burns and Scapens 
(2000) develop their institutional framework for conceptualizing management accounting change. They 
argue that the notion of scripts could equally apply to the notions of rules and routines. Englund and 
Gerdin (2008) criticise the use of management accounting rules and routines as modalities and as 
observable, recurrent actions because there is a risk of conflating virtual structures that generate action 
and the situated doings of individuals. This could lead to drawing erroneous conclusions about 
management accounting change and/ or stability. Therefore, the central criticism regarding conflation of 
structure and agency has not been fully addressed by existing theoretical frameworks.  
SST provides a better alternative that incorporates both Giddens’ duality and critical realism’s analytical 
dualism, including temporality. In his structuration framework, Stones (2005) analytically distinguish 
between four separate but inter-linked aspects of the structuration cycle: external structures as 
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conditions of action, internal structures within the agent, active agency and outcomes. The following 
figure introduce a temporal dimension in the relationship between the parts [1].   
Insert Figure 1 here
From the above figure, the analytical dualism in SST investigates the temporally defined interplay 
between structure and agency in three different time intervals – between structural conditions (Time t-
1), social interactions between agents on the basis of these conditions (Time t) and subsequent 
structural changes or reproductions arising from the latter (Time t+1). In terms of duality of structure, it 
should be clear that internal structures are drawn upon as ‘medium’ of agent’s conduct, whilst internal 
and external structural outcomes represent structure as ‘outcome’ of conduct. The latter will, in turn, 
constitute the internal and external structures at time (t-1) for the next round of structuration. By 
incorporating temporality, SST explores structural change as a process rather than through a snap-shot 
analysis of outcomes. It is a processual approach that explores the temporal dimensions of structural 
change, unfolding over time, through reference to the past, the present and the future (Burns, 2000: 
568).    
2.3 The framework of SST for analysing the paradox of embedded agency and its contribution to the 
extant management accounting literature   
Based on the above comparative analysis of the two structuration approaches, this section presents the 
framework of SST and explains how it will contribute to the paradox of embedded agency and to 
previous studies on Giddens’ ST and SST in the management accounting literature.
2.3.1 Mutually exclusive or complementary ontologies
From a flat and local structuration ontology, Englund and Gerdin (2016) argue that internal and external 
structures cannot be combined into one theoretical framework as all social structures are virtual and 
‘there is simply no room for external structures within a flat and local ontology’ (p. 259, original italics). 
They see that management accounting researchers have to decide which ontology to rely on, i.e. the 
ontological status of external structures. On the contrary, from a SST perspective it is possible to 
combine the internal and external aspects of social structures (Stones, 2001; 2005), acknowledging the 
common ground between Giddens’ ST and critical realism (Coad et al., 2015). This perspective 
contributes to the extant literature on the role of embedded agents in changing management 
accounting practices, including budgeting, (e.g. Ahrens and Ferry, 2018; Englund and Gerdin, 2018; 
Hiebl, 2018; Horton and Wanderley, 2018) as understanding the highly contingent interplay between 
internal and external structures, which is more or less unique to particular social contexts, is vital to 
envisage which possibilities of change and emancipation may be at hand in such contexts (Modell, 
2017). None of previous studies on Giddens’ ST and SST in the management accounting literature has 
explored these possibilities (Jack and Kholeif, 2007; Coad et al. 2015; Englund and Gerdin, 2011, 2016, 
2018). 
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Figure 2 summarises the possibilities of change and emancipation, manifest in the ability of embedded 
agents to make or resist structural change. The proposed framework is based on duality and dualism as 
its two dimensions to analyse structural change from a SST perspective (see section 2.1.2 above for 
detailed explanations of these dimensions).
Insert Figure 2 here
In Quadrant A in Figure 2, the possibilities of change and emancipation will be limited, where the 
agents-in-focus’ propensity for reflectivity are mainly constrained by their internal structures and there 
are few opportunities for emancipation offered by their external structures that act as independent 
causal influences. Under such circumstances (mainly constraining internal and external structures), 
agents-in-focus will be unable to initiate structural changes or even actively participate in the 
implementation of these changes. The possibilities of change and emancipation will be more moderate 
where only one of the two types of structures is imbued with mainly enabling effects on agents-in-focus. 
When internal structures are mainly enabling but external structures are mainly constraining (implied by 
Quadrant B in Figure 2), agents-in-focus intentionally develop strategies aimed at trying to change their 
structural contexts and challenge their external structures even though the latter are relatively 
constraining and act as irresistible causal forces. In Quadrant C in Figure 2, where internal structures are 
mainly constraining but external structures are mainly enabling, agents-in-focus might unintentionally 
depart from the existing social structures. Finally, extensive possibilities of change and emancipation 
might exist in Quadrant D in Figure 2, where internal structures make agents-in-focus highly reflective 
and external structures provide ample opportunities to take advantage of such reflexivity. Under such 
conditions, agents-in-focus actively initiate structural changes and actively participate in the 
implementation of these changes through actively mobilizing resources. 
To move from taken-for-granted duality to critical duality on the vertical dimension in Figure 2, on one 
hand, the embedded agent would require to be able to gain adequate critical distance from their 
conditions of action in order to take up a strategic stance in relation to a particular external structure 
and its situational pressures. To move from intractable dualism to modifiable dualism on the horizontal 
dimension in Figure 2, on the other hand, the embedded agent would require adequate knowledge of 
relevant external structures, including alternative avenues of possibility, as well as adequate power or 
capability to resist or transform in-situ external structures, or to alter one’s position in relation to such 
structures. All things being equal, Stones (2005, p. 115) says, ‘the greater the possession of these 
properties (i.e. distance, adequate critical adequate power, adequate knowledge) the greater the 
embedded agent’s ability to regulate, modulate, deflect or erase specific aspects of such external 
demands and pressures’. 
2.3.2 Explanations and end results
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At this point, certain readers have asked why SST should be used rather Giddens’ ST, which is ostensibly 
very similar in concept, to analyse the paradox of embedded agency in budgeting research. The key 
ontological differences, as have been mentioned above, are that whilst the central tenet of Giddens’ ST 
is the duality of structure, SST assert the complementary ontologies of duality and dualism. SST purport 
to address the ontological weaknesses in Giddens’ ST, particularly its tendency to abstraction and 
difficulty of application to the “ontic” (Jack and Kholeif, 2007). The difference in approach is that whilst, 
as Parker (2006, p. 132) notes, SST is “strong because restricted” to meso-level studies, Giddens’ ST 
claims to have done away with the need to consider external social structures and the divide between 
macro and micro-social considerations (Englund and Gerdin, 2016). Here, the authors are not arguing for 
the superiority of SST over Giddens’ ST. They are simply stating that SST is a robust and credible theory 
for interpretative management accounting research. The case study applying SST in this paper could 
have been written using Giddens’ ST. It would not necessarily have been a better or a worse paper but it 
would have been a different one that would have produced a different account of the failed attempt to 
implement PBB in ESTD.
In particular empirical studies of the role of embedded agency in changing management accounting 
practices, the ontological assumptions about how structure and agency are interrelated will affect end 
results as well as the underpinning explanations of the phenomena under study. Englund and Gerdin 
(2016: 261, emphasis in the original) conclude that the ontologies of SST and Giddens’ ST ‘may well 
come with similar “end results”’ but ‘the underpinning “explanations” may be fundamentally different’. 
We agree with the conclusion that both theories certainly provide different explanations as different 
ontologies offer different world views, especially with regard to the ontological status of external 
structures. However, end results may also be different if the ontological separation of structure and 
agency is not properly addressed in Giddens’ ST. As Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 99) notes, ‘unless 
institutions and actions are analytically as well as phenomenologically distinct, it is difficult to 
understand how one can be said to affect the other…to reduce the empirical problem of conflating 
action and institution, one needs a diachronic model of the structuration process as well as longitudinal 
data’. 
As discussed above in Section 2.1.2.1, SST differentiates between two extremes of duality: taken-for-
granted duality and critical duality. The taken-for-granted duality is very close to what Archer (1995) 
means by ‘inseparability’, ‘because ‘structure’ is inseparable from ‘agency’’ (p. 97). Stones (2005) argues 
that this should not be held to signify a weakness for Giddens’ ST as this is how things are in this case 
and the boundaries between internal structures and agency are not clear to the agent-in-focus. In this 
case, both Giddens’ ST and SST will give similar end results. However, in the case of critical duality, the 
relation between internal structures and agency is not inseparable as Archer (1995) feared and Stones 
(2005, p. 57) feels that this is the ‘harder case’ of duality. Acknowledging temporality in SST is one way 
to address this issue. In this case, both structuration approaches might give different, potentially 
conflicting end results.  
2.3.3 Empirical illustration of using SST to address the paradox of embedded agency 
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The case study in this paper illustrate the key differences between Giddens’ ST and SST in addressing the 
paradox of embedded agency, mainly the existence of external structures, ontic, meso and macro levels 
of social structures, analytical and ontological separation of structure and agency and temporality. The 
key step in strong structuration is to identify the agent-in-focus and their internal structures (Jack and 
Kholeif, 2007), thereby designating the agents who inhabit their perceived external structures.  In Figure 
3, our agents-in-focus are the middle managers involved in the implementation of PBB in the ESTD and 
can be regarded as being at the ontic level.  Here, external agents are found at meso-levels - the local 
senior management and law makers in government – and at the macro level of the supranational 
agencies. The point is that both are seen here as the external agents by middle management. 
Temporality is considered by circumstances and events in in three different time intervals: structural 
conditions prior to the introduction of PBB into ESTD (Time t-1), social interaction during the 
implementation of PBB in ESTD (Time t) and structural changes or reproductions as outcomes of the 
implementation of PBB in ESTD (Time t+1). 
Insert Figure 3 here
3. Research Methods
3.1 Background about the case study 
General sales tax was introduced in Egypt on 3 May 1991 to replace consumption taxes as part of an 
overarching World Bank/IMF Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme.  The ESTD 
became a revenue generating division of the Ministry of Finance with its headquarters based in Cairo 
but covering 23 Regions, with 81 Districts and 25 Offices in total.  In 2003/2004, the ESTD reported sales 
tax revenues of more than L.E. 22 billion (approximately more than $3.5 billion). In 2007/2008, (after the 
customised computerisation project) it collected L.E. 40 billion (about $7.6 billion) [2].  The 
organisational chart of the ESTD is given in Figure (4). As part of the Central Administration for the 
Commissioner’s Affairs, the General Administration for Change and Development was established in 
2004 and was responsible for managing change processes, including the move to PBB.
Insert Figure 4 here
3.2 Data Collection  
According to Greenhalgh and Stones (2010: 1289), “the quadripartite study of structuration involves 
seeking empirical evidence with which to explore and test key concepts and the relations between 
them, depending on the explanandum at hand. Data sources may be multiple and selected pragmatically 
(e.g. depending on access and availability) and include combinations of documents, ethnographic field 
notes, semi-structured and other forms of interviews and surveys, and multi-media such as video or 
screen capture”. For the purpose of this study, a number of three year longitudinal case studies in 
customised computer systems implementation were carried out in Egypt in 2002-2005, one of which 
was inside the ESTD.  Updates were sought in 2008 by the researcher from a number of the original 
participants. 
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The data collection included unstructured and semi-structured interviews, site visits and the collection 
of documentary evidence. 35 interviews were conducted with 22 interviewees, with interviews generally 
lasting between 1 and 2 hours. The total length of the interviews is about 60 hours. The work here 
emerged as an interesting additional factor, developing into a separate study into the implementation of 
a performance based budgetary system.  The researcher was therefore not present in the organization 
throughout the three years but made a number of visits, following an initial period of being involved in 
the project as a trainer.  Data on the use of accounting for outcomes in the World Bank was conducted 
through publicly available secondary sources and through a literature review by mainly the second 
researcher. It should be noted that the analysis of this case study is retrospective and was developed 
more fully once the World Bank began publishing reports on conditionality, M&E and the Egyptian 
Project from 2007 that enabled the authors to contextualise the data collected more fully.
According to Yin (2014, p. 199), ‘any case study finding or conclusion is likely to be more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information’. Interviews were conducted with most 
members of the PBB project team, including accountants, IT developers and top, middle and line-
managers. Other data collection methods used include background questionnaires, direct and 
participative observations, including group meetings with PBB project team, financial accounts and 
budgets. Using materials collected from various sources or data triangulation, this study proceeds to 
triangulate the field data used, enabled what Scapens (1990) calls ‘contextual validity’, the triangulation 
of evidence by collecting different evidence on the same research issue, collecting other evidence from 
the same source and working in teams in order to reach an agreed interpretation of a particular case. In 
this study, the triangulation of interpretations took two forms. Firstly, the two researchers worked as a 
team to interpret the case study and agreed on interpretations of evidence. Secondly, the study 
compares and contrasts the researchers’ findings with the World Bank’s interpretations of the same 
case and reflects on why the two sets of research diverge.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
In empirical research, Stones (2005) suggests that the researcher looks at agent’s conduct analysis and 
agent’s context analysis in order to draw out the nature of structuration processes and their durability. 
He explains agent’s conduct analysis as a process of ‘sifting and sieving’ knowledge, motives, desires, 
purposes, feedback by the agent.  It is about the internal processes of negotiation and reconciliation 
that the agent (or cluster of agents) goes through whilst working on acting and interacting with other 
agents and other structures. In our study, the data comes from interviews with middle management and 
others involved at the ground level in the ESTD performance based budgeting project. Such qualitative 
approach gave participants the opportunity to provide in-depth responses, explain their thoughts and 
emphasise what was important to them because the researchers sought to understand the participants’ 
experiences, meanings and beliefs. Agent’s context analysis, on the other hand, is about ‘the terrain that 
faces an agent, the terrain that constitutes the range of possibilities and limits to the possible’ (Stones, 
2005, p. 122).  The researcher must explore the ‘social nexus of interdependencies, rights and 
obligations, asymmetries of power and the social conditions and consequences of action’. In other 
words, link the external processes of structuration more clearly with the internal processes which have 
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‘previously been too little explicated in structuration theory’ (Ibid). Taking the ESTD middle managers 
involved in the project as our agents in focus, they are involved with other agents-in-context in a 
network of position-practices (see Figure 5).
Insert Figure 5 here
The qualitative content analysis was used in order to enable the interpretation of interview transcripts, 
documents and observations to gain a holistic view of the PBB implementation process in the ESTD. It is 
defined as ‘any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative 
material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings’ (Patton, 2002, p. 453). It compresses 
many words of text into fewer content categories based on obvious rules of coding (Weber, 1990; 
Krippenforff, 2004). In this study, initial coding starts with SST concepts and relevant research findings. 
Then, researchers are immersed in the data and allow new codes to emerge from the data. During 
analysis, elements of quadripartite nature of structuration were identified in the interviews’ comments 
and themes and codes were linked to these components. General-dispositions were explored through 
themes focusing on the middle managers’ perceptions of how their values and beliefs influenced the 
ways in which they acted during the budgeting reform. The middle managers’ application of their 
conjuncturally-specific knowledge was addressed through themes about how their actions changed 
when they were interacting with different agents-in-context in the implementation of PBB in the ESTD. 
In relation to enabling and constraining external structures, themes on the opportunities that helped 
middle managers to act freely and openly and the conditions that inhibited or limited that actions. The 
outcomes of active agency were gleaned at various points throughout the interviews. The following 
table presents examples of first-order expressions and associated second-order theoretical concepts. 
Insert Table 2 here
4. An illustrative Case Study
4.1. Structural conditions prior to the introduction of PBB into the ESTD
For the analysis of this case, the middle managers (i.e. heads of regions and managers of districts) in the 
ESTD were chosen as the ‘agents in focus’. This group of managers are responsible for the 
implementation of the ESTD’s strategy and, therefore, influencing the information flow up, down and 
within the ESTD. As part of their role, they monitor the achievement of budget targets and estimates, 
both revenues and expenditures. The main purpose of the Egyptian accounting system, governed by Law 
No. 27 (1981) and amended by Law No. 139 (2006), is to control the execution of the annual budget 
approved by the parliament. For this control purpose, budget and accounting numbers are continuously 
compared and at the end of the fiscal year variances between the budget (ex-ante) and the accounting 
(ex-post) figures are reported. The Egyptian government accounting system is uniform for the whole 
governmental sector, including all government units. It is a group of regulations and restrictions that 
government units have to follow in the implementation of the general state budget, in recording and 
classifying the financial operations and in preparing the budgetary statements of the government units.
17
Estimated revenues are imposed on us from the top.  We have no say in that. The Ministry of 
Finance does not ask for our opinions. At the beginning of each year, we submit our needs, 
whether current expenditures or capital expenditures. However, appropriations sometime do 
not meet all our needs. Unsatisfied needs are delayed to next year(s). For example, there was a 
building that was intended to be built to absorb the increase in the number of employees. The 
employees were 800 and became 1800. However, the facilities have not been changed. To 
reduce expenditures, we are currently using a four-employee table. I mean that every four 
persons share one table.
The foregoing quote evinced the constraining nature of the Ministry of Finance as an external structure. 
Because of this, middle managers have a strong sense of injustice at not being devolved responsibility 
for their budgets or performance. To cover this sense of lacking in current budgeting practices, middle 
managers actively deal with these shortcomings. Some middle managers invent their own solutions to 
resolve problems encountered. Other managers believe that another set of budgeting practices could be 
supplied to cover the existing lack if only they were understood, accepted or applied properly. A district 
manager draws on his past stock of knowledge with previously used budgeting practices. He said:
Before the introduction of the sales tax, we were collecting registered companies’ budgets in 
each district and we were using them as a basis for our estimates for tax revenues. If the 
companies achieved their budgets we would achieve our estimated revenues. 
Traditionally, the Sector of General State Budgeting (the central budget office) in the Egyptian Ministry 
of Finance centrally manages the process of preparing the government budget, governed by the Budget 
Act No. 53 of 1973 and amended by Law No. 87 of 2005. These structural conditions that middle 
managers draw upon recursively in order to manage their daily activities represent constraining external 
structures that limit the choices available to middle managers in the ESTD. The ESTD has a budgeting 
committee that is represented by two departments in its organisational structure: the General 
Administration for Revenues and the General Administration for Budget and Encumbrances. The first 
department is responsible for preparing revenue estimates and monitoring revenue collection. The 
second department is in charge of preparing expenditure estimates and following up actual 
expenditures. However, the Ministry of Finance normally does not take into account the estimates made 
by middle managers in the ESTD. It always expects that there are an overestimation of expenditures and 
an underestimation of revenues submitted by government units.
Interestingly, almost all middle managers of regions and districts in the ESTD have transposable 
capacities and dispositions as qualified accountants and can effectively manage their own budgets. They 
have a sense that their freedom to manage is lacking in current line item budgeting practices. Drawing 
on his conjuncturally-specific knowledge, one regional head expressed this lack as follows:
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The above comments reveal the dissatisfaction of middle managers with the existing budgeting 
practices. The freedom to prepare budget targets and estimates and the accountability for continuous 
improvement represent important aspects of budgeting that are currently lacking. 
4.2. Social interaction: the implementation of PBB in the ESTD
Towards the end of the 1990s perceptions that attitudes in many key economic activities had become 
lax lead to the termination of the existing World Bank economic reform and structural adjustment 
programmes in Egypt.  Tourism and oil revenues were declining, negatively affected the trade balance.  
The budget deficit grew from 1.0 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 to 4.7 per cent of GDP in 1999 – 2000 [3]. 
Furthermore, on 24th May 2001, sales tax was extended to include all wholesale and retail sales meaning 
that more than 140000 firms became active sales tax participants.  This broadening of the base was 
designed to cancel out differing levels of tax compliance but a more comprehensive computer system 
was required to cope with the expansion. 
Two solutions for the Egyptian financial crisis were introduced. The first solution is an IT reform 
recommended by the Ministry of Finance. The second solution is a budgeting reform proposed by the 
World Bank. The Ministry of Finance has initiated an IT project, known as the ‘Integrated Automation 
Project’ (IAP), in January 2000[4]. The aim of this project is to support the Ministry of Finance in 
computerising the government expenditure system. This system is based on building a Government 
Expenditure Information Network that relates the different sectors of the Ministry of Finance and linking 
these sectors with other departments in the Ministry of Finance and other related agencies. The new 
system claims to provide a comprehensive, reliable and timely budget and financial management 
information and helps the Egyptian government to effectively manage the budget and expenditures and 
control funds. 
Later, the World Bank introduced a budget reform programme to the Egyptian government in 
September 2000, recommending that they replace current traditional line item budgeting with PBB.  The 
response was the plan to experiment with PBB in the ESTD and then roll out the reforms to the rest of 
the Ministry of Finance and the Egyptian government. Formal approval was given in 2002 by the 
Egyptian parliament. A Presidential Decree No. 275 of 2002 was issued to regulate the experimental 
application of PBB in Egyptian governmental units. A World Bank delegation met with the ESTD’s 
officials in 2002 and the project began shortly afterwards (although informally information systems 
were already being designed from 2000). As there are scare financial resources to implement the IAP, 
the IT reform became part of the PBB project. In this regard, the former Minister of Finance 
acknowledged this fact by saying ‘[i]n the absence of a management information system, reporting and 
monitoring systems, results-oriented budgeting will be a dilapidated. So, a necessary requisite for 
results-oriented budgeting to survive, flourish and succeed is to automate all government expenditures 
and revenues’ (Hassanein, 2005: 4).  
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The Minister of Finance was found to be a key champion for the government of Egypt’s move to 
a results focus. This minister was well versed in the international experience of other countries, 
such as Malaysia and OECD member countries. The minister underscored the importance of 
giving increased attention to improving the management of public expenditures by moving 
forward with a set of pilots to demonstrate how results- based M&E could be used to better 
manage budgetary allocations. The Minister of Finance will play a key leadership role in any 
effort to introduce results-based M&E in Egypt.
In the ESTD, a Principal Committee and a project team were formed following a meeting with the World 
Bank delegation in 2002. The Principal Committee was composed of the Commissioner (the Project 
Leader and Manager), helped by two consultants (from the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank).  In 
addition six functional area leaders (Heads of Central Administration or General Managers) led area 
project teams composed of key users and an IT area developer. After forming the project team, each 
area project team started implementing its action plan that has been set in its committee’s 
responsibilities. All action plans of different committees have been simultaneously implemented. 
4.2.1. Intractable dualism: agents-in-context as constraining and enabling external structures 
It is necessary at this point to delineate which actors could be regarded as external structures from the 
point of view of the agents in focus, the middle managers of regions and districts. In this case, there are 
a number of external actors, the World Bank consultants, senior Egyptian governmental officials and IT 
developers.
4.2.1.1. International consultants of the World Bank, the former minister of finance and the former 
commissioner of the ESTD and as enabling agents-in-context.  
The role of the World Bank’s international consultants was in the early stages of PBB implementation. In 
June 2001, they visited Egypt to assess the climate and capacity for building M&E practices in the 
Egyptian governmental units. Another visit of the World Bank’s international consultants was in 
March/April 2002 to support the Ministry of Finance in its efforts at improving performance orientation 
in budgeting by conducting a workshop on PBB. In June 2002, a distance learning forum was conducted 
to raise the awareness of 21 senior officials about PBB and its possible implementation in Egypt. In 
October 2002, another visit complemented by a workshop was made with a specific focus on PBB and 
building M&E practices in general. In this visit, local consultants were selected to support the Ministry of 
Finance on the PBB pilots. 
In assessing Egypt’s readiness to introduce results-based M&E, the international consultants of the 
World Bank, Kusak and Rist (2004: 51), identified the former Minister of Finance as a key champion. 
They mentioned that:
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Other senior top management were optimistic about the abilities of ESTD officials to implement PBB as 
their version of M&E. The ESTD’s former Commissioner pointed out that:
The Sales Tax Department is the first governmental unit in Egypt that has started implementing 
this type of budget reform from the fiscal year 2002/2003. The selection of the Sales Tax 
Department by the Minister of Finance was a proud moment for all the Sales Tax Department’s 
officials.  The Sales Tax Department is qualified to implement this budget reform that requires 
well-trained employees who are capable of using modern technologies and achieving high 
quality.
All the above comments indicate that the international consultants of the World Bank were key players 
in convincing senior Egyptian officials to accept and support the move toward PBB, feeling that this 
budgeting reform is the solution for the Egyptian financial crisis at the end of 1990s. International 
consultants, the former Minister of Finance and the ESTD’s former Commissioner are enabling external 
structures of middle managers in the ESTD as they facilitate the move to PBB that overcomes the 
perceived shortcomings in the existing budgeting practices. 
4.2.1.2. IT developers, the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Law and the local consultants as constraining 
agents-in-context 
In the ESTD, the IT infrastructure and its applications were completely renewed. The GSTACS 
(introduced with sales tax in 1991) was upgraded and an on-line tax return filing service was developed 
to help registrants submit their tax return electronically which came into effect from 1/7/2004. It 
emerged that the computerization was planned informally before 2002, and was ready to start as soon 
as the monies were available.  The GSTACS system had been effectively programmed before the PBB 
pilot project had begun. Oracle database version (8) was used to automate the existing government 
accounting system, governed by Law No. 27 (1981) amended by Law No. 139 (2006).  An IT developer 
commented that:
The automation seeks to speed up performance, increase accuracy, avoid human errors, and 
reduce time, effort and cost. The government accounting system was analysed, designed and 
programmed. … Furthermore, employees were trained on using the computerised system. 
We automated the old accounting system because all people are used to using it. [authors 
italics]
This quote clearly shows that the actions of IT developers as external agents-in-context negatively affect 
the move to PBB and constrain the ability of middle managers to change existing structures. Although 
there was a beneficial move to replace cash-based with accruals based accounting systems, the 
automation reinforces rather than reforms the traditional line item budget system. This automation 
reveal the intentions of senior government officials to continue using existing budgeting practices.   
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Confirming these intentions, a key meeting with World Bank officials was due in September 2004 (which 
was observed by one of the researchers) and it becomes clear that little progress has been made up to 
this point. The Minister of Finance Consultant (a university professor) asked the following questions:
We need to have a performance-based budget for ESTD before the World Bank meeting on 
12/09/2004. Is that possible? …The estimated revenues for 2004/2005 are L.E. 26 billion and 
the appropriations (chapters 1 and 2) are L.E. 260 million. What are the programmes planned 
to achieve the L.E. 26 billion? … We need a programming and performance budget with L.E. 
260 million to collect L.E. 26 billion. If you continue using the old system, you would achieve 
only L.E. 22 billion (the previous year actual revenues). What are the means to increase the 
revenues by L.E. 4 billion? 
Now, the consultant is clearly using the language of PBB – identifying an outcome and looking for what 
resources need to be allocated to achieve the outcome.  However, the answers received to these 
questions are revealing. A budgeting accountant responded to the Minister of Finance Consultant’s 
questions in a way that indicates some resistance:
The use of performance-based budget is currently difficult because the whole government 
budget is a line-item budget. So it would be difficult that some government units use line item 
budgets and other units use performance-based budgets. 
This was supported by general managers who stated:
We currently use the line-item budget. If the Ministry of Finance wants us to implement the 
performance-based budget, it would send the appropriate forms to fill. (The General Manager 
for Budgeting and Encumbrances)
The Ministry of Finance should itself implement the performance-based budget. If it has not 
implemented the budget reform, the current situation would continue for a long period and 
there would not be integration. (The General Manager of Planning)
From this quote, the actions of the Ministry of Finance reflect the intentions of the senior government 
officials that reject the change to PBB at the moment as the Ministry of Finance continues its traditional 
role as constraining external structures by using line item budgeting practices. It appears that at this 
stage, two years into the project, the desirability of outcomes based budgeting has not yet been 
transmitted and that there is internal opposition to the idea of the ESTD being a pilot for the Ministry as 
a whole. However, the Minister of Finance Consultant responds back in a manner that indicates the 
expectations of the Ministry of Finance:
The implementation will be gradual and will take from 5 to 10 years, like Malaysia. We cannot 
change the current budgeting system…What we need is a performance-based budget for 
2004/2005, together with the state budget before 12/09/2004… We need to re-allocate the 
line-item budget for 2004/2005 to programmes according to responsibility centres. What do 
you need to do this? 
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The estimated revenues for 2004/2005 are L.E. 26 billion. There is a planned increase in 
revenues with L.E. 4 billion this year. What are the spending requirements to achieve this 
increase? 
The General Manager of Planning Department suggests, working on a contrasting logic to the 
consultant:
We can analyse the actual expenditures for the previous year (2003/2004). The fundamental 
appropriations at the beginning of the year were L.E. 215 million and the actual expenditures 
at the end of the year were L.E. 275 million. Thus there was L.E. 60 million deficit or additional 
appropriations.    
The Consultant tries to bring the reasoning back to being forward looking:
Is there a relationship for such increase with other variables such as the increase in collected 
revenues or the increase in the workforce? Or is it just coincidence? What were the reasons 
for the additional appropriations and the means used to fund them? We can assume that the 
increase in expenditures would be the same as the prior year (L.E. 60 million). 
To which a general manager responded:
This quote clearly reveals that the local consultants as agents-in-context do not have any intention to 
change the existing budgeting practices in the near future. The underlying problem begins then to 
emerge.  The accounts to control and record distributions of money have not been established on a 
programme basis nor sub-divided into performance units. It seems clear PBB was perceived by middle 
managers and other senior officials as a complementary tool to the current line item budget rather than 
a replacement to it. According to the Budget Act No. 53 of 1973, amended by Law No. 87 of 2005, the 
government units are required to set their activities in the form of programmes and prepare programme 
budgets for their activities in addition to the current and capital budgets. This law prevents the Ministry 
of Finance from taking active actions to move to fully implementing PBB. 
4.2.2. Taken-for-granted - critical duality: middle managers as knowledgeable and reflective agents-
in-focus
Middle managers draw on their knowledge of existing budgeting practices and critically reflect on it to 
identify the difficulties in the operationalisation of PBB as indicated in the following issues.  
4.2.2.1. The problem of budget estimates
The Budget Act No. 53 (1973), amended by Law No. 87 (2005), requires the current estimation base of 
both revenues and expenditures using the results of prior three years as a base for predicting the 
coming year revenues and expenditures. However, there are no clear guidelines for preparing 
performance-based budget estimates. The Minister of Finance Consultant asked:
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The Minister of Finance Consultant then suggested:
The budget in Egypt is based on actual basis. What it is supposed to do is show the labour in 
Egypt as fixed cost except incentives… You can start with prior year actual expenditures (L.E. 
275 million) as an initial basis for estimation and, then, add 10% the annual increase in wages 
and salaries as an inevitable increase. 
The existing budget law as external structures limits the choices available to middle managers to 
prepare budget estimates of the new budgeting system. These discussions indicate that there was no 
agreement on a unified basis for preparing the performance-based budget or even the starting point for 
such estimates. Should these estimates be based on current year appropriations and expected 
additional appropriations by an amount equal to prior year additional appropriations? Or should 
previous year actual expenditures be modified by only inevitable increases such as the 10% annual 
increase in wages and salaries?  PBB that identifies the activity and then a (reduced) resource allocation 
again appears to be receding. 
4.2.2.2. The Cost Allocation Problem
Another issue related to the implementation of PBB is the problem of cost allocation. The Minister of 
Finance Consultant asked the following question:-
Can you convert the line item budget for 2004/2005 into a performance-based budget?
The answers to this question elicited a range of conflicting responses:
We prepared the current year budget according to the object of expenditure classification as 
we received the old forms from the Ministry of Finance.  We do not have the functional 
classification of expenditures. (The General Manager for Budgeting and Encumbrances)
We have the functional classification of expenditures (chapter 1 and 2) on the costing system 
but for the previous year 2003/2004. We have not prepared the functional classification for 
the current year because we have not received cost data reports from some districts. (Cost 
Accounting Department Manager)
The Minister of Finance Consultant then commented:
Is it possible to prepare both cost classifications together (by functions and by object of 
expenditure), which allow for allocating the total appropriations to different types of 
expenditures and different responsibility centres at the same time?
The next response by the World Bank Consultant is significant:
There were a lot of reasons for such increase and we cannot classify them into categories. In 
addition, your suggestion means that there is an official recognition of the additional 
appropriations and that the costs have to increase. We can use the basic appropriations for 
2004/2005 (L.E. 260 million) as a minimum estimation.
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We are interested in the costs of programmes and their activities. If we get these figures, 
that’s enough and there is no need for relating them to the object of expenditure 
classification.
The Manager of Cost Accounting Department commented:
We actually analysed the previous year expenditures according to both cost classifications.  
The costing software is able to do so.
The Ministry of Finance is still working as a constraining external structure and a real obstacle for the 
move to PBB. The question arises from these exchanges: what exactly was PBB meant to achieve?  Did 
the World Bank consultant imply that programmes and activity information was enough for now, or for 
the whole project?  What was the long term aim for accountability by outcomes? There was a final, 
more fundamental problem though that emerged from discussions – who was responsible for 
performance evaluation?
4.2.2.3. The Problem of Performance Evaluation
Another issue related to the implementation of the PBB is reflected on assigning the responsibility for 
performance evaluation. The Ministry of Finance Consultant, following World Bank recommendations, 
stated that there should be a totally separate and independent department for performance evaluation. 
There appears to have been some resistance to performance evaluation taking place and the decision as 
to who would be responsible for it was never made.  Recommendations that it should be the Planning 
Department which was in charge of performance measurement ignited a debate about auditability and 
IT.  One IT general manager stated that ‘performance evaluators should have sufficient knowledge of IT’ 
and a developer expanded the problem by saying ‘currently, persons who audit our work, do not 
understand in IT. They report only on computers’ problems such as the breakdown of a printer or a 
network’.  The World Bank Consultant disagreed:
Auditors evaluate results. It is not necessary for auditors to understand IT. Auditors can get 
help from some experts when they do not have such expertise. The Central Agency for 
Accountability should be responsible for performance evaluation in the organisation as it has 
experts in different financial, administrative and technical areas.
The Ministry of Finance Consultant agreed with this suggestion, saying:
The Central Agency for Accountability has permanent auditors within organisations. It is a 
good idea for performance evaluators to live in the field…  There should be performance 
evaluation units in each district and each region.  Moreover, there should be different experts 
in each functional area such as tax and information systems.
This exchange highlights the fact that PBB became simplified into a more mechanical discussion of 
auditability and structures, which reflects the accountability for control and assurance internalised by 
senior Egyptian governmental officials. However, the danger of simplification can be seen the other way, 
as taking ‘managerial freedom’ and ‘accountability for continuous improvement’ to turn them into 
formulaic processes, which makes middle managers show some resistance to the idea of auditability of 
performance. 
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We have been preparing the annual plan and have been using efficiency and effectiveness 
measures before implementing the performance-based budget. This helped us to absorb the 
idea and complete its components. Furthermore, we depend on the existing organisational 
structure to set programmes for each region and district. 
The above measures reveal that the PBB project resulted in incremental changes to existing monitoring 
and evaluation procedures. What is developed is a system of performance reporting identifying different 
activities and measuring changes within them, rather than a full system of PBB [5]. Performance data 
are developed independently of the line item budget and control accounts, and cost figures have not 
been attached thereto. This system reflects a slight development in the existing planning system 
adopted by ESTD before the introduction of PBB. 
4.3.2. The failure of the enabling agents-in-context in managing the change process of budgeting 
A review conducted by the World Bank found that international consultants of the World Banks had not 
paid sufficient attention to ‘defining specific performance indicators in the agencies, the incentives 
facing staff and the need for change management initiatives’ (WBOED, 2004: 18). These matters were 
left to local consultants who direct the PBB implementation process. The requirements of implementing 
PBB  from the point of view of the World Bank does not appear to have been transferred to local 
consultants, who took a pragmatic approach to the project, drawing on existing local structures and 
practices. The outcomes of this were no real change to existing budgeting practices and ‘the support of a 
group of key ministers for M&E has been substantially frustrated by sceptical mid-level officials’ 
(Mackay, 2007: 55 & 56).    
The decision to abandon PBB in the ESTD was associated with shifts in the interests and underlying 
power distributions that have supported and legitimated the institutionalization and sustainability of 
PBB arrangements. By the end of 2005, the former Minister of Finance (the key champion and the PBB 
sponsor and initiator) resigned. This put an end to any future development of the PBB system in ESTD or 
any other governmental unit. In this regard, the World Bank consultants, Kusak and Rist (2004), argue 
4.3. Structural changes or reproductions: the failure of PBB implementation in the ESTD
4.3.1. Incremental changes in existing budgeting practices 
Some incremental changes in the existing structures of middle managers in the ESTD were observed. As 
an outcome of PBB implementation, the IT reforms to update the computerised systems used to collect 
sales tax revenues were successful, with significant increases in tax collected. However, performance 
based budgeting was experimented with and then abandoned in 2006 by a new Minister of Finance, 
although some level of performance reporting within ESTD was achieved. The ESTD reformulated its 
mission, principles, strategy, policy and methodology and added three new performance indicators (i.e. 
productivity, quality and results) to existing efficiency and effectiveness measures. A researcher in the 
General Planning Department pointed out:
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There is a contradiction between imposing estimated revenues on us from top to down and 
preparing a performance-based plan from down to top. This is not consistent with the 
accountability principle. The heads of regions and the managers of districts should participate 
in setting their own budgets to be able to achieve them. The major disadvantage of the 
performance-based budget implementation so far is that it has not been associated with 
decentralising the authorities of preparing budgets to the heads of regions and the managers 
of districts. 
As this quote refers to, regional and district managers are always interested in greater freedom to 
manage and more accountability for continuous improvement, whereby assessments of their 
performance become demands or stimuli that promote improvements in policy, organisation or 
management. However, the evidence before middle managers suggests that it is highly improbable that 
that ‘the role of a political champion is key to ensuring the institutionalization and sustainability of 
results-based M&E systems’ (P. 21) and ‘the presence of a national champion can go a long way toward 
helping a country develop and sustain M&E systems’ (P.33). However, the key Egyptian champion had 
been replaced by 2005 and the new Minister of Finance has changed his priorities and cancelled the PBB 
project.  
In April 2006, the Egyptian Government announced a plan to integrate the Income and Sales Tax 
Department into a single, unified Egyptian Tax Authority (USAID, 2006).  Other governmental units 
which had begun performance-based systems in c.2002 have since abandoned them through political 
upheaval and changing priorities. In 2007, the former ESTD Commissioner (the PBB Manager in ESTD) 
resigned and a new Commissioner was appointed. The new Commissioner of ESTD announced on 11 
February 2008 that he is going to replace PBB with a balanced scorecard (BSC) system to link incentives 
to performance indicators, saying that he no longer believes in the benefits of PBB.  However, there is 
no evidence as yet that the BSC has been implemented. 
4.3.3. The success of the constraining agents-in-context in frustrating the change process of budgeting 
In 2005, the Budget Law was amended to require the implementation of PBB as a complementary tool 
rather than a primary tool. Although legislation had been passed to promote PBB, the accounting 
legislation requiring line budgeting was never repealed and therefore, line budgets were still required 
from all government departments and ministries. It seems that the IT reform won in the end and the 
Egyptian government reproduced the traditional system of accountability that relies primarily on 
centralized command and control systems and focuses exclusively on securing compliance with input 
control and process and that does not held individuals accountable for their individual performance. The 
introduction of performance-based budgeting into ESTD has not changed the way of preparing budget 
targets and estimates or the form of accountability. The ESTD’s budget plans and estimates are still 
centrally prepared by the Central Budget Office in the Ministry of Finance and regional and district 
managers, the budget programme managers, have no greater freedom to manage or more fair 
accountability for their performance. One district manager commented that:
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they will have responsibility for performance or even for participation in budgets or target setting. 
Perhaps more fairly, regional and district managers do share some PBB principles – that one day they 
will be allowed freedom to manage as professional managers and accountants and that this will be 
beneficial – but perhaps the 'incompetent' senior management prevents this from happening by 
breaking their promises with the World Bank on producing a new system of accountability that increases 
discretion and assesses individual accountability.  
There is an interesting document published on the World Bank website in which the former Minister of 
Finance who resigned looks back on the attempt to implement PBB in the Ministry.  He appears quite 
belligerent after the experience:
Never issue a law or decree that would force a move from input to outcomes budgeting on the 
throats of disinterested parties. Unless you lobby and buy-in the interested stakeholders while 
convincing them of the fruits of bringing down the budget deficit and bringing welfare to the 
citizen first, success can be a high risk venture. From my personal point of view, the phrase that 
should win the day in the move towards results-orientation: 'Bought-in stakeholders FIRST; 
sustained, incentive-based M&E systems SECOND; and legislation comes LAST.' (Hassanein, 
2005)
This view of the former Minister of Finance indicates that the amendment of the Budget Law to force 
the move from line item budgeting to PBB was wrong as buy-in on the ground was needed. As seeing is 
believing, middle level officials and other stakeholders at the micro level were not convinced with the 
budgeting reform as it was not materialized in reality. 
5. Discussion: Middle managers as embedded agency in SST terms
In this study, SST is used to complement Englund and Gerdin’s (2011) flat and local ontology by 
incorporating external structures and dualism to analyse the paradox of embedded agency, focussing on 
resistance to change in budgeting practices. Furthermore, an interpretive case study is used to illustrate 
this framework. In relation to internal structures, the SST framework identifies two types of embedded 
agency as two ends of a continuum: taken-for-granted agency and critical agency. Stones’ (2005) 
concept of agents’ conduct analysis is used to analyse embedded agency in relation to internal 
structures.  In relation to external structures, SST classifies embedded agency into two categories as two 
ends of a continuum: agency that is unable to change intractable external structures and agency that is 
able to change modifiable external structures. Stones’ (2005) concept of agents’ context analysis is used 
to analyse embedded agency in relation to external structures. 
Using the ESTD as an illustrative case study, middle managers in the case constitute the agents-in-focus 
or embedded agents at the micro (ontic) level and other agents-in-context are the Egyptian senior 
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governmental officials the meso level and the supranational agency (the World Bank’s consultants) the 
macro level. These multiple sets of structures give the researchers the opportunity to understand the 
processes of resistance to the failed attempt to institutionalise PBB in the ESTD from the point of view of 
middle managers [6]. Based on the concept of position-practices, the middle managers’ context analysis 
covers their relationships with other agents-in-context in different institutionalised positions, 
particularly the World Bank’s international and local consultants, key champions, IT developers and 
existing laws and regulations enforced by the Ministry of Finance.
Using the SST framework presented in section 2.3 and Stones’ (2005) concepts of agents’ conduct 
analysis and agents’ context analysis (see Figure 6), external agents-in-context are divided into 
constraining external structures and enabling external structures [7]. Budget law, government 
accounting, Ministry of Finance, local consultants, on the one hand,  represents constraining external 
structures in relation to middle managers. They act as intractable external structures that put pressures 
on middle managers to routinely draw on their internal structure and reproduce line-item budgeting 
practices, i.e. taken-for-granted embedded agency. International consultants of the World Bank, former 
Minister of Finance and former Commissioner of the ESTD, on the other hand, are enabling external 
structures. They also act as intractable external structures but provide opportunities for middle 
managers to strategically draw on internal structures by criticising traditional budgeting practices and 
adopting elements of PBB.  However, the constraining external structures were more powerful than the 
enabling external structures in this case study. The outcome was the use of PBB as a complementary 
tool.  This is an example of the circumstances in which ‘human beings will have limited possibilities to 
change their dispositions to act and identify opportunities for emancipation in the wider social context 
in which they are embedded’ (Modell, 2017, p. 24).
Insert Figure 6 here
In order to be able to make or resist structural change, embedded agents require adequate knowledge 
of alternative possible courses of action and adequate critical distance and adequate power to resist. 
We can observe in this case that the middle managers as embedded agency were ‘sieving and sifting’ 
their knowledge of both the circumstances around PBB and their knowledge of their external agents, 
and evaluating the possibilities available to them. The conjuncture of events, whereby government 
ministers had put in place the larger aspirations of PBB but not managed the change project to the 
extent to which legal, accounting and information technology systems were aligned with those 
aspirations, was adequately understood by managers.  They may support the principles of PBB that 
would devolve greater responsibility to them, be involved in committees that develop the systems and 
welcome an alternative form of budgeting that would allow them a greater degree of participation, but 
they also had knowledge – perhaps more than the senior ministry officials – of the day to day problems 
they encountered having to comply with requirements of legal and computer systems.  The middle 
managers had critical distance from the World Bank aims, and indeed from the Minister of Finance: they 
could see very clearly the flaws in the change management process.  The consultants – the more 
immediate external agents – had the problem of convincing the managers that the possibilities offered 
by PBB would materialise, were factual, real possibilities.  Faced with ministers who had not believed 
their estimates on resource requirements and broken promises of devolved responsibility, middle 
managers may appear to resist the change.  They were unlikely to lose their jobs by not working 
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sufficiently hard to make sure that PBB was successful – they could resist by simply not co-operating, 
and had adequate power to do so - but in the end, it was not non-compliance that ended the project.   
6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the extant management accounting literature on the use of structuration 
theory in addressing the paradox of embedded agency in making or resisting structural change as 
follows. Firstly, it uses SST to integrate Giddens’ ST with critical realist theory, incorporating duality and 
dualism in a stronger model of structuration to explore the possibilities of change and emancipation that 
result from the interplay between internal and external structures. The theory offers a wide range of 
circumstances in which change and emancipation can take place. Stones (2001) reject Archer’s (1995) 
idea that critical realist theory and Giddens’ ST are incompatible and mutually exclusive theoretical 
frameworks. Ashraf and Uddin (2015: 492) argue “Stones’ strong structuration theory argues for a 
distinction between external structures (as represented by position-practice relations – and containing 
many of the ‘real’ attributes of structures recognised by critical realist) and internal structures (‘virtual’ 
structures in accordance with Giddens’ definition)”. This paper uses SST to complement Englund and 
Gerdin’s (2011; 2018) flat and local ontology by incorporating external structures and dualism to analyse 
the paradox of embedded agency in budgeting research. Stones (2005) suggests that the ontological 
position of Giddens’ ST advocated by Englund and Gerdin (2011; 2018) has several theoretical 
disadvantages, as recognised by Archer, Mouzelis, Cohen, Bhaskar and others. Stones’ SST addresses 
and synthesises these critiques. Using Stones’ SST, there are four possibilities of embedded agency: 
taken-for-granted agency, critical agency, agency that is unable to change intractable external structures 
and agency that is able to change modifiable external structures. Stones’ concept of agents’ conduct 
analysis is used to analyse the first two types of embedded agency and Stones’ concept of agents’ 
context analysis is used to analyse the other two types of embedded agency. 
Secondly, the paper has highlighted the key differences and commonalities between Giddens’ ST and 
Stones’ SST. One of the fundamental differences is the ontological status of social structures, i.e.
whether or not some structures are autonomous from and independent of the agents who reproduce 
them (Coad et al., 2015; Englund and Gerdin, 2016). This key difference has led to other related issues 
that were illustrated by the case study in this paper such as the existence of external structures, ontic, 
meso and macro levels of social structures, analytical and ontological separation of structure and 
agency, temporality, agents’ conduct analysis and agents’ context analysis. Despite these differences, 
the two structuration approaches can be reconciled and complement each other. For example, Table (1) 
above indicates that the GIAMER framework introduced by Englund and Gerdin (2018) can be closely 
linked to taken-for-grantedness and criticalness in SST. This means that a flat and local ST perspective 
recognizes differences between more or less taken-for-granted reproduction of structures. It also 
recognizes that some structures are more or less stable/ fluid structures or more or less resistant to 
change. For instances, Englund and Gerdin (2016, p. 260) argue that ‘…researchers applying a flat and 
local ontology may well find that some structural elements (such as market logics and positions) may be 
essentially taken-for-granted and thus continuously and unreflectingly reproduced in and through day-
to-day social practices. That is, we may also find some structural elements are perceived by actors as 
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objective, taken-for-granted, non-controllable and even “external” to the actors in question…’ (p. 260, 
original italics). 
Thirdly, this paper also contributes to the extant SST studies in management accounting (Jack and Koleif, 
2007; Jack and Kholeif, 2008; Coad and Herbert, 2009; Coad et al. 2015; Feeney and Pierce, 2016; Harris 
et al., 2016; Makrygiannakis and Jack, 2016; Adhikari and Jayasinghe, 2017; Daff and Jack, 2018). 
Previous studies in this area have not largely addressed the issue of duality and dualism in SST and its 
implications for management accounting change and stability. This paper explores the types of duality 
(taken-for granted vs critical) and dualism (intractable vs modifiable) in SST and applies them to the 
paradox of embedded agency in budgeting research. The case findings revealed that the highly 
contingent interplay between internal and external structures was vital to understand the role of middle 
managers as embedded agents in changing budgeting practices in the ESTD. For example, external 
structures such as budget law and Ministry of Finance constrained middle managers to routinely draw 
on their internal structures and reproduce line-item budgeting whereas other external structures such 
as international consultants of the World Bank and former Minister of Finance enabled middle managers 
to strategically draw on their internal structures and accept some elements of PBB. The possibilities of 
change and emancipation under such particular social contexts in which there is an interplay between 
internal and external structures have not been explored in the extant literature on the role of embedded 
agents in changing management accounting practices (e.g. Ahrens and Ferry, 2018; Englund and Gerdin, 
2018; Hiebl, 2018; Horton and Wanderley, 2018).     
Finally, middle managers have been chosen as the agents-in-focus in this study to examine whether they 
caused the failure of PBB, as the World Bank claimed. A further research opportunity is to consider 
senior managers as the agents-in-focus and examine their role in making structural changes as they 
might face different possibilities of change and emancipation. For example, If we re-assess the case 
taking the senior management – ministers and higher ranking civil servants – as the agents-in-focus, 
then their capacity to resist the World Bank is based on the knowledge that at this conjuncture, there is 
only one possibility open to them if they are to obtain World Bank funding, which is to accept the 
condition that M&E systems are put in place with the PBB experiment in the Ministry of Finance.  They 
have less critical resistance and will seriously compromise their core commitments (to maintain the 
economy) if they fail to solicit and take the money available for the development of infrastructure.  They 
also have more knowledge of the central aim – to raise finances through taxation rather than the 
allocation of resources within ministries – which means that they will focus on automation of the tax 
collection systems first, and always have M&E as a secondary aim.  This may have meant that they did 
not fully analyse the possibilities of failure of the projects, or the need for a more cohesive approach to 
change management.  The context for this level of hierarchy includes external agents both at the macro-
level (World Bank) and the more micro-level (the middle managers): simply, unless agents context 
analysis includes adequate knowledge of the possibilities arising from all surrounding agents and 
structures, then they are less likely to act differently, and current structures become reproduced rather 
than agents finally being able to do otherwise.  The outcomes ultimately remain the same, rather 
changing internal structures and action.
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Endnotes
[1] This figure has some similarity with some other diagrams in the management accounting literature
and the institutional theory literature - see for example Burns and Scapens (2000, p. 9) and Barley and
Tolbert (1997, p. 101).
[2] In 2003/2004, the ESTD reported sales tax revenues of more than L.E. 22 billion (approximately more
than $3.5 billion). In 2007/2008, (after the customised computerisation project) it collected L.E. 40 billion
(about $7.6 billion).
[3] Source: Central Bank of Egypt.
[4] Two phone conversations were conducted with the IAP Director and the Minister of Finance’s
consultant on 23 November 2004 to explore more details about this project.
[5] Performance-based budgeting goes beyond the performance reporting system. The identification of
programmes and the measurement of changes therein are set forth on a cost basis so that performance
costs are equal to total costs for budgetary purposes.
[6] As the data were collected mainly from the middle managers as the agents-in-focus about the events
and circumstances surrounding the implementation of PBB in the ESTD, the point of view of middle
managers means both the opinion of middle managers and the contextual situation of middle managers.
[7] From a SST perspective, external structures are conditions of action or the structural context of 
action faced by the agents-in-focus (Stones, 2005). They are mediated largely through the notion of 
position-practice relations. A position-practice is a social position and associated identity and practice, 
together with the network of social relations which recognise and support it (Greenhalgh and Stones, 
2010, p. 1288). Material artefacts such as formal accounting reports, rules presented in procedures 
manuals, computerised systems represent position-practice relations that form part of an agent’s 
external structures (Coad et al., 2015, p. 158). In the case study, the position-practices of agents-in-
context (e.g. Minister of Finance, ESTD’s Commissioner, local consultants and international consultants 
of the World Bank) and material artefacts (e.g. budget law and government accounting system) are 
considered part of middle managers’ external structures.  
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2Figure (2): the ability of embedded agents to make or resist structural change 
1. External Structures (Agents-in-Context)
2. Internal Structures
2.a General dispositions and embodied knowledge (‘habitus’)
2.b Conjuncturally-specific knowledge relevant to the immediate situation.
3. Action/active agency
Middle managers routinely or strategically draw on their internal structures.
3. Outcomes
Intended and unintended consequences and change and stability in internal 
and/ or external structures.   
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Meso local level (local rulemakers – Egyptian Government)
Micro level: Middle management as the agent-in-focus (implementers)
Figure (3) Middle managers as the agent-in-focus within the wider local and global contexts
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Figure (6): middle managers in the ESTD as embedded agency 
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Table (1): The relation between SST and GIAMER framework
Taken-for-granted duality 
(Embeddedness)
Critical duality 
(Reflexivity)
Very explicit and straightforward 
(unambiguous)
Ambiguity Implicit and open-ended 
(ambiguous)
Conditions for reproduction are met 
(adequate)
Inadequacy Conditions for reproduction are 
no longer met (inadequate)
A great time/ space extension 
(general)
Generality A more narrow scope (specific) 
One (homogeneous) Multiplicity Multiple (heterogeneous)
Table (2): Examples of first-order expressions and second-order theoretical concepts
First-order expressions Second-order theoretical concepts
- ‘The head of regions and the
managers of districts should
participate in setting their own
budgets to be able to achieve them.’
- General-dispositions
- ‘Currently, persons who audit our
work do not understand in IT. They
report only on computer problems
such as the breakdown of a printer or
a network’.
- Conjuncturally-specific knowledge
- ‘Estimated revenues are imposed on
us from the top…The Ministry of
Finance does not ask for our
opinions’.
- ‘The Minister of Finance was found to
be a key champion for the
Government of Egypt’s move to a
results focus’.
- Constraining external structures
- Enabling external structures
- ‘The employees were 800 and
become 1800. However, the facilities
have not been changed. To reduce
expenditure, we are currently using a
four-employee table.’
- Active agency
- ‘The implementation will be gradual
and will take from 5 to 10 years, like
Malaysia. We cannot change the
current budgeting system’.
- Outcomes
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